Proxy war is a policy tool of choice for states seeking to pursue their interests abroad without the risk and expense of sending their own troops into the field. In the past, it was common for great powers to meddle in regional conflict involving a near-peer competitor and to back a variety of competing factions—the North Korean army was able to hide in China during the Korean War; US forces and Soviet troops were often allowed to retreat into Pakistan while fighting in Afghanistan; and Iran, Russia, and Turkey have all used proxies to support different rebel groups in Syria.
But proxy warfare comes with costs. Aside from introducing new dimensions of complexity and risk to the conflict, it can draw in other global powers who have their own vested interests in supporting various sides—adding to the overall instability and intensity of the struggle. And, as the conflict continues, it can become increasingly difficult for the intervening state to pull out—particularly if their own citizens have come to embrace their role in the fight.
To be effective, a proxy strategy must involve a deep understanding of both the nature of power asymmetry and how that translates to conflict. It also requires a clear and consistent approach to both managing expectations among domestic and international audiences and dealing with emerging conditions—both self-inflicted and beyond control—that can affect the proxy’s ability to achieve its intended objectives. This is especially true for those intervening states that want to retain the ability to negotiate a settlement when desired.